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   Abstract 
 
Following the paradigm for reforming the current CAP, the first objective of this study is 
to give insights into the economic impact of post-2013 CAP measures at different levels 
of aggregation (e.g. EU, Member State and region). The post-2013 CAP measures 
included are directed towards income for the farmers, competitiveness, valuable areas 
and ecosystem services. The second objective is to analyse the impact of a scenario that 
combines the above mentioned post-2013 CAP measures. This study can be seen as a 
first attempt to quantify the transition to a CAP with more targeted measures at the 
European level and reveals considerable methodological and data challenges. A key 
finding is that the impact of the various measures is very different with regard to various 
economic indicators.  
1.  Introduction  
 
The CAP as a policy instrument was designed to increase agricultural productivity and, 
thereby, output. It appeared at a moment when food security within Europe (the EU-6 and 
beyond as well) was a real issue. The principal additional motive has been to serve as a 
mechanism to enhance average farmer incomes to be more in line with the non-
agricultural earnings for labour. The stimulus provided to the supply-side was so 
effective that the resulting production surpluses had to be deflated, and the first attempts 
to reduce output were the milk quotas in 1984 and the MacSharry reforms in 1992. The 
basis of direct / coupled payments beginning after 1992 was to compensate for income 
loss due to cuts in price support. The system of Community assistance for the agricultural 
sector remained coupled to particular products. Only with Pillar 2– introduced by Agenda 
2000 in 1999 – has a non-coupled revenue stream began to be of any importance for the 
agricultural sector in financial terms, and only since 2005 (following the Mid-term 
Review of 2003) has a system based on the principle of decoupled payments been firmly 
established (in relation to specific products). The Health Check review in 2008 confirms 
the process of the disappearance of coupled payments by 2012 in their quasi-totality.  
 
The transition from coupled to decoupled payments has been spurred by the WTO 
insistence that further negotiations on tariff-related barriers in international markets, in 
general, should depend upon resolving unequal competitive positions of agricultural 
producers, in particular. Farmers in the EU have been benefiting from public support in 
the EU internal markets through tariff protection and, as well, through measures to 
encourage exports in order to clear domestic markets. The WTO impetus for the EU in 
1992 was the desire to complete the Uruguay Round, and the continuing negotiations in 
the Doha Round provide a similar impetus at the current time. 
 
Decoupling has demonstrated that farmers can survive in a financial environment in 
which market support is shifted to income support. The difficulty is that the parallel shift 
in the financial burden has been from the consumer to the taxpayer, and this has rendered 
payments to the agricultural sector more transparent in political analysis and public 
debate. Therefore the justification for continuing financial support for the agricultural 
sector has been increasingly presented in terms of the ecosystems services rendered on behalf of society, in a situation in which there is market failure regarding the additional 
costs of ‘environmentally sensitive’ production, which cannot be transferred to the 
consumer via the price mechanism. The services rendered are considered in terms of both 
minimum standards of good practice (currently the cross-compliance in exchange for 
base-level revenue support by Pillar 1 payments) and in terms of supplementary 
objectives entailing additional costs for specific efforts and /or revenue foregone because 
of such efforts (the contractual Pillar 2 payments).  
 
The future of the Pillar 1 payments is undoubtedly in a transition from Single Farm 
Payments based on historical entitlements, as is the case today, to a system that is 
uniquely related to agricultural practices combining market orientation and the provision 
of public goods. The next financial programming period for the CAP (2014-2020) has to 
be designed on the assumption of agricultural and horticultural sectors operating 
competitively within  international markets, without EU financed producer support. This 
corresponds to the logic of the Lisbon Agenda in which competitiveness is based on the 
encouragement of knowledge development, which leads to innovation as a principal 
outcome; in the current programming period, measures for the development of human 
and social capital are found in Axis 1 of Pillar 2. Furthermore, the financial structure of 
the renewed CAP has to be ‘greened’ through maintaining the dimension of 
‘environmentally sensitive’ production methods and the provision of ecosystems services 
as a joint-product; animal welfare is to be included as part of minimal performance 
standards for the agricultural industry, along with the provision of biodiversity and the 
promotion of climate change mitigation and adaptation measures. 
 
According to the above paradigm for reforming the current CAP, the first objective of 
this study is to give insights into the economic impact of the post-2013 CAP measures at 
different levels of aggregation (e.g. EU, Member State and region). The second objective 
is to analyse the impact of a scenario that combines different post-2013 CAP measures as 
briefly articulated in the foregoing discussion. Therefore the remaining part of this paper 
is organised as follows. First we discuss the different scenarios and post-2013 CAP 
measures that will be investigated. Section 3 then discusses shortly the methodology, data 
and assumptions. A more thorough discussion can be found in Helming et al. (2010) and 
Nowicki et al. (2009). We will present some selected results in section 4. Section 5 
finishes with discussion and conclusion.  
2.  Scenarios 
 
In this study it is assumed that targeted measures will be introduced gradually in the 
period 2014 to 2020. The time horizon of this study is 2020 as the measures are fully 
introduced. We distinguish between exogenous drivers that are constant in the different 
scenarios and drivers that are more policy driven. Exogenous drivers include changes in 
population, income expenditure, technological change, etc. Data used here are borrowed 
from other studies such as Scenar 2020 and Scenar 2020-II or from projections of 
international institutes like OECD and FAO.  The reference scenario 
With respect to policy variables, the reference scenario incorporates the 2003 CAP 
reform, including the sugar and dairy policy reform and the abolition of the milk quota 
system in 2015. We include the implementation of the Health Check, which among other 
things already foresees a 10% reduction in direct income support under the Single 
Payment Scheme (SPS) (in this paper also referred to as pillar I direct payments) and an 
increase in regional development payments until 2013. With respect to the budget of the 
CAP, we assume that this remains constant in nominal terms. No further WTO agreement 
or other trade liberalisation measures are included. With respect to the Renewable Energy 
Directive (RED), a 10% share of biofuels in the transport sector in 2020 in the EU is 
assumed. 
The Stylised CAP Reform scenario with targeted measures 
The Stylised CAP Reform scenario analysed in this study includes five elements, all 
related to the Pillar I direct income support, in which it differs from the reference 
scenario. No extra national co-financing is assumed and the available budget to support 
the sector is similar to the reference scenario (budget neutral). The following measures 
are included in the Stylised CAP Reform scenario: 
- measures to improve competitiveness and sustainability;  
- Extra direct payment to farmers in valuable areas;  
- Extra payments to ecosystem services; through extra agri-environmental payments.  
- A base premium paid as a flat rate per hectare per Member State.  
- To pay for all these payments, the Stylised CAP Reform scenario assumes a 100% 
abolition of the direct income support under the SPS/SAPS.  
 
As the focus of this study is on the effectiveness of measures,  we have assumed that each 
member state allocates 25% of their SPS direct income support (pillar I direct payment) 
to each of the four measures.  
3.  Methodology and data and assumptions 
 
Model descriptions 
To perform the analysis, a modelling framework is constructed, consisting of two 
economic models namely LEITAP and CAPRI.  LEITAP is a global computable general 
equilibrium model that covers the whole economy including factor markets. More 
specifically, LEITAP is a modified version of the global general equilibrium Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model. Agricultural policies are treated explicitly (e.g. 
production quotas, intervention prices, tariff rate quotas, (de)coupled payments). 
Information is used from the OECD's Policy Evaluation Model (PEM) to improve the 
production structure and a new land allocation method that takes into account the 
variation of substitutability between different types of land as well as a new land supply 
curve have been introduced.  
 
CAPRI is an EU-27 partial equilibrium model for the agricultural sector at NUTS-2 level 
(aggregated regional farm approach). It consists of a supply module and a global market model. The supply module of CAPRI comprises about 50 crop and animal activities for 
each of the around 280 regions (at the so-called NUTS-2 level covering EU27, Norway, 
Western Balkans and Turkey), and includes about 50 inputs and outputs. Each 
independent model optimizes regional agricultural income at given prices and subsidies, 
subject to constraints on land, policy variables and feed und plant nutrient requirements 
in each region. An important feature of the supply module of CAPRI is that agricultural 
activities are divided into an extensive (low input, low yield) and an intensive type (high 
input, high yield). The CAPRI global market model is a comparative static Multi-
Commodity model. It covers 47 primary and secondary agricultural products. The Supply 
and global market model of CAPRI are iteratively linked. Equilibrium ensures cleared 
markets for products and young animals, match of feeding requirements of national herd 
(source: www.capri-model.org). 
 
The methodology to analyse the questions at hand and to obtain consistent results 
between the different models is based on a link between LEITAP and CAPRI. General 
model descriptions of LEITAP, CAPRI and the model linking, including further literature 
references can be found in Nowicki et al. (2009) and Helming et al. (2010). Due to space 
limitations this not repeated here. In this paper the description of the methodology is a 
function of the selected results presented in section 4.  
 
Grouping of rural development (Pillar 2) measures 
The reference scenario in CAPRI and LEITAP models the existing budget and rural 
development (RD) measures (Nowicki et al., 2009; Helming et al., 2010). However, the 
reference scenario can’t model separately the 46 rural development measures 
distinguished in the planning period 2007-2013. Hence, the individual rural development 
measures are grouped according to fundamental similarities in the economic mechanisms. 
In doing so three broad categories of post-2013 CAP measures are included in CAPRI 
and LEITAP, namely competitiveness measures, valuable areas payments and agri-
environmental payments to improve ecosystem services. Table 1 shows how the existing 
RD measures are linked to these three categories. 
Table 1. Grouping of RD measures to post-2013 CAP measures in CAPRI 
Post-2013 CAP measures  RD measures 
Competitiveness  01 – Human Capital Investment [111-115, 131-133] 
  02 – Physical Capital Investment [121-126] 
Valuable areas  03 – LFA Land Use Support [211, 212] 
  04 – Natura 2000 [213] 
Eco-system services  05 – Agri-Environment measures[214-216] 






 Implementation Pillar 1 direct payments and post 2013 CAP measures 
 
Implementation of Pillar 1 direct payments 
In LEITAP Pillar 1 direct payments are implemented as land payments in the various 
agricultural sectors. Coupled payments are directly coupled to sectors. Decoupled 
payments are implemented as an equal payment rate to the production factor land in all 
eligible sectors and therefore do not provide an incentive to switch between eligible 
sectors. Of course, changes in decoupled payments will result in changes in the allocation 
of production factors between eligible sectors (e.g. agriculture) and non-eligible sectors 


















Figure 0: Effect of direct payment (dp) on hectare of crop x (horizontal axes) in case all 
crops are eligible for the direct payment (left figure) and in case not all the crops are 
eligible for the direct payment (right figure). p is output value (€ per hectare), dp is direct 
payment (€ per hectare), r is land rent (€ per hectare), x is crop (hectare) 
 
In CAPRI the SPS direct income support (or pillar I direct payment) at the level of the 
regional farm is modelled as a decoupled direct payment linked to land. The SPS direct 
income support is interpreted as ‘crop specific subsidies to land’ (Britz et al., 2006). The 
income support or direct payment is the same for all eligible crops. Thus, the payment 
has the effect of increasing land rents (compared to no policy) and increasing agricultural 
income, but has no effect on the choice between eligible crops. In the reference scenario, 
we assume that all land use classes distinguished in CAPRI are eligible, except fallow 
land. In this study, fallow land is treated as a land buffer. This however only partially 
captures the possible changes in allocation of land between agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors in case of changes in Pillar 1 direct payments. 
1 
 
                                                 
1 The current available version of CAPRI includes a land supply curve, comparable to the LEITAP model. 









1 In figure 0 the economic mechanisms behind the models in case of a pillar I direct 
payment per hectare is pictured. In the left figure all crops(sectors) are eligible and the 
positive effect of the direct payment on supply is offset by the increase of the land rent. In 
the right figure not all crops (sectors) are eligible and the direct payment is not fully 
included in the land rent. This in turn gives the eligible crops room to expand until 
marginal costs equals marginal revenue again. The expansion effect depends on the share 
of land rent in total revenue, the share of direct payment in total revenue and the supply 
elasticity. 
 
Implementation of post-2013 CAP measures 
Competitiveness measures 
Investments in human and physical capital are likely to lead to an overall increase in 
productivity and efficiency. In CAPRI competitiveness measures are included by shifting 
the IO coefficients of the different activities in the different regions. Data is supplied via 
a link with the general equilibrium model LEITAP. Both in LEITAP and in CAPRI the 
magnitude of the shift is basically a function of the ratio between the extra budget for 
investment in human and physical capital and the output value and value of the physical 
capital stock respectively; if the value of output is relatively low (high) and the pillar I 
budget for direct payments is relatively large (small), the ratio between human capital 
investments and output will be high (low) and the effect on productivity and efficiency 
will also be high (low). The magnitude of the shift is equal per activity and region, but is 
different per member state. Member States with high ratios between human capital 
investments and output value and between physical capital investments and the value of 
the physical capital stock are especially located in the EU-10. These ratios are relatively 
low in countries of the EU-15 (Helming et al., 2010; Table 3.5). The economic effect of 
these differences is that member states in LEITAP and CAPRI that achieve the highest 
percentage changes in productivity and efficiency may expand their production. The extra 
supply of agricultural products from these member states will decrease market prices. 
This in turn will dampen the extra supply and might even decrease supply in member 
states with relatively low productivity and efficiency changes. 
Valuable area payments 
LFA and Natura 2000 areas are included as valuable areas. LFA and Natura 2000 
payments are included as a payment to land in LEITAP. We use information on the 
distribution of the payment across sectors from FADN (2005 data) to distribute payments 
across sectors (e.g. pork and poultry and horticulture receive no LFA payments and 
relatively more payments are distributed to grassland than crop land).  
Ecosystem services 
In LEITAP a payment to land has been used as a proxy for agri-environment payments to 
eco-system services. In contrast with the LFA payments, the agri-environment measure 
can also reduce labour and output productivity. Information of the current distribution 
across sectors from FADN is used to distribute payments across sectors (e.g. pork, 
poultry and horticulture receive no agri-environment payments and relatively more 
payments are distributed to grassland than crop land). In addition, to capture the extra 
labour effect, labour productivity decreases (10% of increase in land payment rate). 4.  Results 
 
Total impact in the EU-27 
Agricultural production and trade 
The Stylised CAP Reform scenario (total impact with all measures combined) leads to an 
increase in EU primary production of about 1.5% (Figure 1). This is especially due to 
increased productivity because of investments in measures to improve competitiveness. 
Figure 1 also shows the effectiveness of the different measures individually on 
agricultural production. The measures to improve competitiveness will increase 
agricultural production by about 2%. The effects of other targeted measures on 
production are limited. As explained before (agri-environmental) payments to ecosystem 
services lead to more extensive production methods, which lower yields per unit of input. 
As a result the agricultural production will decrease slightly (Figure 1). Area payments 
and the base premium keep extra land in production that would otherwise be abandoned. 
The effect of this is a slight increase in agricultural production. Compared to the area 
payment and the base premium, the 100% abolition of decoupled SPS direct income 
support shows an opposite effect on agricultural production. The negative production 
effect of the latter is limited. This  indicates that, at least in our system of models, SPS 
direct income support is fairly decoupled from production.  
 
 
Figure 1: Effectiveness of individual measures and the total impact of the Stylized CAP 




Trade is mainly influenced by competitiveness measures that increase productivity and 
reduce product prices relative to the prices of competitors. Exports increase by more than 
10% and imports decrease by 7%. The introduction of the base premium and valuable 
area payments increase exports slightly, as EU prices decline slightly. Abolition of 
income support has the opposite effect. Agri-environmental payments to ecosystem 
services lead to a small decline in exports as EU prices increase slightly. Overall the 
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The impact on the total area of agricultural land is related to the development of land 
prices. Valuable area payments, agri-environmental payments to ecosystem service and a 
base premium keep agricultural land in production under agriculture. Subsidies to 
competitiveness have a marginal impact on land use, as they stimulate production on the 
one hand, but on the other hand use less input per unit of output. Abolition of direct 
income support under the SPS (pillar I direct payment) has a negative impact on the 
agricultural area in production (-7%), as marginal areas are abandoned. Overall, the 
Stylised CAP Reform scenario just has a negative effect on total agricultural area. 
 
Land prices are higher due to valuable area payments, ecosystem service payments and a 
base premium, as the economic rent (i.e. subsidy) is partly taken by the fixed production 
factor, land. The impact of competitiveness measures on land prices is negligible, as on 
the one hand production increases and therefore demand for land is higher while on the 
other hand less land input is needed to produce one unit of output and therefore less land 
is needed. In this case, both effects more or less cancel each other out. Abolition of direct 
income support under the SPS  implies substantially lower land prices. This is also an 
important mechanism to explain why production is not going down very much due to the 
abolition of direct payments. The lower land prices stimulate further structural changes at 
farm level and keep EU agricultural production competitive. 
 
Prices of agricultural products 
The Stylised CAP Reform scenario leads to a decline in the consumer price of EU 
primary production of about 2%. This is especially due to increased productivity because 
of investments in measures to improve competitiveness. The measures to improve 
competitiveness will reduce agricultural consumption prices by about 2.7%. The effects 
of other targeted measures on agricultural production and prices are limited. Agri-
environmental payments to ecosystem services lead to more extensive production 
methods, which reduce yields per unit of input. This corresponds with a limited decline in 
supply and somewhat higher prices for agricultural commodities. Area payments and the 
base premium are a kind of subsidy that leads to a small increase in agricultural land and 
production and consequently to a small decline in consumer prices. Compared to the area 
payment and the base premium, the 100% abolition of SPS direct income support (the 
pillar I direct payments) shows an opposite effect on consumer prices, as subsidies are 
reduced in this case and agricultural production decreases slightly. 
 
Regional and environmental impacts in the EU-27 
Measures to improve competitiveness 
As we have seen above, the largest effect on agricultural production stems from measures 
to improve competitiveness. Below we show the effect of measures to improve 
competitiveness on regional supply of some selected agricultural products within the EU-
27. Figure 2 shows that supply of agricultural products increases particularly in the EU-
10.  As explained above, the value of the additional budget for competitiveness measures 
and physical and human capital investments in the EU-10is relatively high compared to the current production level and capital stock. As a result, there is a relatively large 
increase in productivity and efficiency in the EU-10.  
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Figure 2: Effectiveness of competitiveness measures on regional supply of cereals (upper 
left corner), other arable field crops (upper right corner), meat products (lower left 
corner) and other animal products [milk and eggs] (lower right corner) in comparison 
with the EU-27 average (% change compared to the reference scenario) 
Source: CAPRI 
 
In case the case productivity and efficiency effect of the competitiveness measures are 
relatively small, negative market and price effects could offset the productivity and 
efficiency effects. This occurs with regard to cereal production in Denmark and in 
regions within the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Greece and Italy. In the United 
Kingdom cereals are substituted for fodder crop activities. In Poland arable field crops 
are substituted for cereals. As a result, the production of arable field crops decreases in 
some regions within Poland. 
 
Figure 2 also shows the effect of competitive measures on meat products. Production of 
meat increases especially in Eastern Europe, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Ireland and in 
regions in France and Portugal. The production of meat decreases in the United Kingdom 
and in Hungary. The decline in meat production in Hungary is especially due to the slight 
decline of pork production in Hungary. This is explained by changes in prices of inputs and outputs, which affects competitiveness for fixed resources in Hungary, in favour of 
other animal products.  
 
The effects of measures to improve competitiveness stimulate the production of other 
animal products in Eastern Europe, Ireland and parts of Sweden (Figure 2). The effect on 
other animal products is also slightly positive in the rest of Europe, with the United 
Kingdom and some regions within the Netherlands as exceptions.  
Regional income  
Compared to other post 2013- CAP measures full abolition of the decoupled direct 
income support as provided by the SPS (the pillar I direct payments) has the largest 
impact on agricultural income per NUTS-2 region (see left figure of Figure 3). Here 
income or gross value added (GVA) is measured as revenue plus EU payments minus 
variable costs. The decline of the GVA per NUTS-2 region as a result of the abolition of 
the pillar I direct payment varies from more than minus 20% in regions within France, 
Germany, United Kingdom, Austria, Sweden and in the EU-12 countries to a range 
between -7 and 0% in the Netherlands. These differences are explained by the differences 
in the regional share of the direct payment provided by the SPS in total income in 




f 4.5: The impact of abolition of direct income support (left map) and the GVA from 
Figure 3: The impact of abolition of direct income support (left figure) and the GVA 
from agriculture (right figure) in the Stylized CAP Reform scenario, given as a 
percentage change compared to the reference scenario per NUTS-2 in the EU-27 
Source: CAPRI 
 
The total impact of the Stylised CAP Reform scenario on regional agricultural income 
can be positive in some regions. This is the case in regions in the south-east of France, in 
Austria and in some Eastern European regions (right hand figure in figure 3). These 
regions either receive a large amount of post-2013 targeted payments, including the base 
premium per hectare, or they gain more than average from productivity, efficiency and 
consequently production changes due to the extra investments in human and physical 
capital. Moreover, the share of direct payment under the SPS in regional agricultural 
         
< -20 %  < -13%  < -7%  < 0%  < 25% 
 income might be  relatively low in the reference. The largest decline in income can be 
found in regions that receive a relatively large amount of direct income support under the 
SPS in the reference scenario and a relatively limited amount of post-2013 targeted 
payments in the Stylised CAP Reform scenario. These are, in particular, regions in the 
north-east of France, the south of the United Kingdom and some regions in Poland, 
Czech Republic and Slovakia.  
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
The economic tools, as they currently stand, are more useful tools for analyses on the first 
pillar of the CAP, but less so for the analyses of effects of Pillar 2 and post-2013 CAP 
measures. However, modelling the reductions in SPS direct income support  within the 
first pillar (or pillar I direct payments) is not without its problems either, as the impact of 
decoupling is not yet empirically known. Pillar 2 and post-2013 CAP measures are even 
more difficult to analyse. This is especially caused by the range of different measures 
with different objectives which can be implemented in many different ways in individual 
Member States or regions. Moreover, also in this case there a lack of empirical data and 
hard evidence concerning the impact of targeted measures on farmers' behaviour.  
 
The strengths of the methodology presented above can be summarised as follows: 
-  The whole budget for different kinds of EU income support is accounted for.  
-  Differences in the initial distribution of the budget for RD measures (Pillar 2) over 
farm types and regions are translated to activities and regions in the market models 
(CAPRI, LEITAP). This is achieved by the extensive use of data from FADN and 
Dyna-CLUE (Verburg  and Overmars, 2009) 
-   Integrated and EU wide approach. The approach takes into account changes in prices 
and quantities at sectoral and regional level.  
 
Some difficulties modelling the post-2013 CAP measures are discussed below.  
-  As already stated above, empirical or ex post information for estimating the impact of 
post-2013 CAP measures is very scarce. Therefore, the simulations of impact of post-
2013 CAP measures require some assumptions on what these effects could be. This, 
combined with the strong dependence on the current second pillar measures for the 
modelling, highlights the current exploratory character of this study.  
-  Post-2013 CAP measures to improve competitiveness are translated in such a way that 
they affect production. However, in the financial programming period 2007 to 2013, 
part of this budget can also be used for on-farm capital investments that should reduce 
emissions from agricultural production to the environment. This is the case in the 
Netherlands, for example, where almost 67% of the budget of measure 121 (physical 
capital investments, see Table 1) should be used for this type of capital investments. In 
general, as investments in competitiveness are more directed to stimulating more 
environmentally sustainable production techniques as mentioned above or food quality 
rather than food quantity, the production and price effects as presented in this report 
might be overestimated.  
-  Due to a lack of data, the rate of return on investments is assumed equal per sector and 
Member State. This implies that agricultural production increases most in Member 
States with a relatively high ratio between the value of extra investments and the value of production or physical capital (see Table 3.5). In reality, structural, institutional and 
other differences between Member States might result in differences in the rate of 
return on investments mentioned above. Moreover, the investments might vary per 
sector and region. These differences are not taken into account. 
-  Public goods and transaction costs are not included in the modelling, although they are 




Britz, W., T. Heckelei, I. Pérez (2006). Effects of decoupling on land use: an EU wide, 
regionally differentiated analysis. Agrarwirtschaft 55: 215-226. 
 
Helming, J.F.M., S. Jansen, H. van Meijl and A. Tabeau (2010). European farming and 
post-2013 CAP measures; A quantitative impact assessment study. LEI Report 2010-085. 
LEI, part of Wageningen UR, The Hague. 
 
Nowicki, P., K. Hart, H. van Meijl, D. Baldock, M. Banse, J. Bartley, K. van Bommel, J. 
Helming, K. Jansson, T. Jansson, I. Terluin, K.H. van der Veen, D. Verhoog, P. Verburg 
and G. Woltjer (2009) Study on the Impact of Modulation. Contract No. 30 - CE-
0200286/00-21. Directorate-General Agriculture and Rural Development,  
European Commission, Brussels. 
 
Verburg, P.H. and K.P. Overmars (2009) Combining top-down and bottom-up dynamics 
in land use modeling: exploring the future of abandoned farmlands in Europe with the 
Dyna-CLUE model. Landscape Ecology 24(9): 1167-1181. 